This paper studies the e¤ect of termination rates on substitution between …xed and mobile calls and access, in a model where heterogeneous consumers can subscribe to one or both types of o¤ers. Simulations show that each (…xed or mobile) termination rate has a positive e¤ect on the take-up of the corresponding service, via the waterbed e¤ect, and lowers subscriptions to the other service, via a cost effect. The prevailing asymmetric regulation, with very low …xed and higher mobile termination rates, corresponds to the social optimum. However, the interests of the mobile operators and of the di¤erent customer groups do not coincide.
Introduction
The Issues at hand. New technologies and innovative service providers often challenge the provision of traditional services. One of the most striking examples is the advent of mobile telephony, and its impact on …xed telephony services. Only three decades ago, …xed-line operators ful…lled all communications needs over their networks, but in the last 20 years mobile telephony has signi…cantly altered the historical market structure. All over the world, wireless services have recorded substantial growth in terms of subscribership, revenues, and usage, and despite the recent economic crisis, the number of mobile subscribers has continued to grow.
Much of the success of the mobile sector is due to …xed-mobile substitution. Major technological advances and cost reductions have enabled mobile carriers to decrease the di¤erence between …xed and mobile prices, allowing them to become strong competitors to traditional …xed providers. At the same time, the …xed and mobile markets have been subject to regulatory intervention, but to di¤erent degrees: While …xed telephony operators' retail and wholesale prices (i.e., the "mobile termination rates" charged to other operators for receiving their calls) tended to be strongly regulated at cost, for mobile operators only termination rates were eventually regulated, and until recently at values far above marginal cost.
Empirical studies have attempted to quantify …xed-mobile substitution (see, for example, the survey by Vogelsang (2010) , as well as the following section), but there is a lack of theoretical investigation about the e¤ect of consumers'preference for mobility on …xed-mobile substitution. This paper tries to …ll this gap. Clearly, there is a variety of factors that could be considered as potential causes of …xed-mobile substitution, and none on its own provides a su¢ cient explanation. This paper focuses on the role of asymmetric regulation of termination rates on …xed and mobile networks as a contributing factor.
The paper presents a model with three independent but interconnected operators, one …xed and two mobile networks. The key novelty is the construction of the demand side. All subscribers spend the same fraction of their time outside home, but depending on their personal preference for mobile telephony, they choose whether to subscribe to a …xed or a mobile network, or to both. Di¤erently from the previous literature, this paper considers the only realistic case, where mobile-only, …xed-only and "…xed-mobile" customers are all simultaneously present in market equilibrium. This framework is in line with recent evidence from the market. The association of European Telecom Regulators (BEREC, 2011) reported that although the share of mobile-only households increased and that of …xed-only households decreased over time, having both is now the most common situation in Europe (62% of households, on average) and that this share is not declining over time. 1 The model set out below shows that the possibility of call and access substitution can a¤ect call pricing if subscribers are heterogeneous and …rms want to price discriminate.
More speci…cally, when mobile termination rates are relatively high, mobile-to-…xed prices are distorted downward from marginal cost, while when mobile termination rates are relatively low (almost at cost) both mobile-to-mobile and mobile-to-…xed calls are downward distorted. Since mobile-only customers both make and receive more calls on their mobile phones than those that hold both a …xed and a mobile subscription, while both types of consumers are equally a¤ected by the level of …xed fees, a usage-discriminating "waterbed e¤ect" arises that transmits termination pro…ts via discounts in call prices.
The main aim of this paper, though, is to analyze the impact of varying levels of termination rates on consumers'subscription decisions. The key question is whether the di¤erent regulatory treatment of termination on …xed and mobile networks a¤ects the development of …xed and mobile subscription decisions. Numerical simulations based on the model show that each (…xed or mobile) termination rate has a positive e¤ect on the take-up of the corresponding service, via the waterbed e¤ect, and lowers subscriptions to the other service, via a cost e¤ect. Moreover, because of the same e¤ect higher termination rates increase the number of consumers who do not subscribe to any service.
Finally, the socially optimal combination of termination rates is analyzed: Fixed termination rates should be set at cost, and mobile termination rates above cost. The interests of mobile operators and di¤erent consumer groups are not coincident, though.
Both mobile operators and mobile-only consumers prefer a …xed termination rate at cost, while users with both …xed and mobile phones and …xed-only consumers prefer a higher level. On the other hand, consumers prefer a level of mobile termination rate at or below 1 Based on the 2011 E-communications household survey, the number of households having at least one mobile subscription is rather high and homogeneous -from 82% to 96% (with an average of 89%) -across Europe. On the other hand, …xed-line penetration is extremely heterogeneous: It is very high in countries such as Sweden (98%), the Netherlands (89%) and France (87%), whereas only 17% of Czech households are connected. Mobile-only households range from 2% to 81%, while the share of …xed-mobile users range from 15% to 94%. the social optimum, while mobile operators would like to set this rate at a higher level.
Summing up, the model implies that high mobile and low …xed termination rates can lead to an additional shift of subscriptions from …xed to mobile networks. Furthermore, taking account of the social bene…t from mobility, this structure of termination rates tended to be socially optimal, while regulation of termination rates as such was also justi…ed.
Literature Review. There exists a sizeable economic literature on the relationship between …xed and mobile telephony, and on the role of …xed-to-mobile termination rates. Wright (2002) considers …xed-to-mobile calls with a focus on mobile termination rates, while others (e.g., Valletti and Houpis, 2005) analyze how socially optimal mobile termination rates depend on the magnitude of network externalities, the intensity of competition in the mobile sector, and the distribution of customer preferences. These papers however do not consider the role of …xed-mobile substitution (both at access and service level), and more importantly, they do not take into account consumer heterogeneity with respect to the bene…ts from mobility, as done in this paper. Armstrong and Wright (2009) , Baake and Mitusch (2009) and Hausman (2012) analyze the role of call substitution and discuss voluntary vs. regulated setting of termination rates. These authors show that substitution between …xed-and mobile-originated calls weakens the competitive bottleneck of call termination, and brings the termination rates that …rms would choose closer to the e¢ cient level while remaining above cost. Hence, the welfare gains from regulating mobile termination rates are smaller, while private incentives do not imply excessively high levels. This paper departs from previous studies by analyzing the more realistic situation where substitution a¤ects not only the types of calls made but also consumers'access decisions. Moreover, the current model highlights how subscription decisions and welfare are a¤ected by both mobile and …xed termination rates.
Closest to this paper is Hansen (2006) , who also investigates …xed-mobile access substitution in a model with competition in the mobile market and subscribers with varying mobility bene…ts. Contrary to the present analysis, though, in his model the heterogeneity in the preference for mobility does not a¤ect the types of calls that consumers make. By contrast, this paper assumes that when a consumer is on the road, he cannot make …xed calls. Moreover, Hansen does not analyze the most realistic and thus most practically relevant market structure that this paper focuses on, with the simultaneous presence of mobile-only, …xed-only, and …xed-mobile subscribers. User mobility is also present in Valletti (2003) , but in a model with mobile-only consumers moving between urban and rural areas while obtaining access to mobile services conditional on the mobile operators'coverage.
Though applied to a di¤erent setting, the game-theoretic structure of this paper is similar to the one developed by de Bijl and Peitz (2009) , who analyze the e¤ect of access and retail price regulation on the adoption of voice over IP telephony. In their model, as in this analysis, consumers …rst choose which technology to adopt. Firms then compete in their respective markets, given these adoption decisions.
On the policy side, Bomsel et al. (2003) study the impact of …xed and mobile termination rates on …xed-to-mobile or mobile-to-…xed tra¢ c. The authors estimate that the transfer from …xed networks and their customers, as a result of high mobile termination rates, has amounted to 19 billion Euros in France, Germany and the UK over 1998 to 2002. According to these authors, this transfer harmed …xed customers and operators, probably damaged competition in the …xed market, and distorted competition between …xed and mobile operators. The present theoretical analysis con…rms that higher mobile termination rates are likely to have increased the adoption of mobile telephony and to have reduced …xed access, but also highlights that this termination rate structure is likely to have increased social welfare when the bene…ts from mobility are accounted for.
The current paper is theoretical, but it is important to review also the relevant empirical evidence on …xed-mobile substitution (see the surveys by Woroch, 2002, and Vogelsang, 2010) . The evidence for …xed-mobile substitution is rather mixed but suggests that call and access substitution are increasing over time. For example, Rodini et al. (2003) , using data from the US, show that households'subscriptions to second …xed lines and mobile services are access substitutes, while Woroch (2005, 2010) …nd substantial substitutability between …xed and mobile subscriptions. Some recent studies provide stronger evidence on …xed-mobile call substitution. Briglauer et al. (2011) …nd for Austria that …xed and mobile calls are strong substitutes while access substitution is rather weak. Ward and Zheng (2012) , using panel data from China, …nd that …xed and mobile telephony services have become fairly strong substitutes for both usage and subscriptions. Barth and Heimesho¤ (2012a,b) , using panel data on EU27 countries, show modest substitution e¤ects on …xed and mobile subscriptions, while the estimated cross-price elasticity of the mobile price on …xed line call demand is relatively large compared to previous studies. Grzybowski (2012) analyzes substitution between access to …xed-line and mobile telephony in the European Union. He …nds that decreasing prices for mobile services increases the share of mobile-only households and decreases the share of …xed-only and …xed-mobile households, which suggests substitution between …xed-line and mobile connections. Finally, Grzybowski and Verboven (2013) also analyze the substitution between …xed-line and mobile telecommunications services. The authors show that …xed and mobile connections are generally perceived in the EU as substitutes, especially in regions with a higher GDP per capita, but also that there is much heterogeneity across countries due to the interplay of speci…c social and economic features (i.e., households with di¤erent age, education, professional activity, etc.). Moreover, the authors show that from the …rms'point of view there is strong complementarity between …xed-line and mobile connections, enabling incumbents to leverage their strong position in the …xed-line market into the mobile market.
Note that none of these empirical studies presents evidence on the impact of …xed and mobile termination rates on consumers' subscription decisions. Hence, this paper also provides new testable predictions for future empirical work on …xed-mobile substitution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented, and the equilibrium retail tari¤s of mobile and …xed operators is found. In Section 3 the e¤ect of …xed and mobile termination rates on subscription decisions and welfare is analyzed.
Finally, in Section 4 conclusions are reported. Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Model and Pricing Equilibrium 2.1 Setup
Consumers and …rms. There are three …rms: two mobile networks and one monopoly …xed network.
2 The …xed network is regulated; its call prices are set by the regulator at marginal costs, and its total pro…ts are equal to zero.
Consumers, whose total mass is …xed at 1, can subscribe to a mobile network and/or to the …xed network. According to their network choice, they are denoted mobile-only (M), …xed-only (F), and …xed-mobile (FM) subscribers. Consumers spend a fraction of their time 2 (0; 1) outside home. When they are on the move, which happens with probability , consumers can only use their mobile phones to make or receive calls. When they are at home, which happens with probability 1 , consumers have access to a …xed and/or a mobile phone; if they have both, they choose whichever is cheaper to make calls.
Calling patterns are balanced, and consumers are on the move or at home independently of each other. 3 They are heterogenous in their relative bene…ts from mobility and, independently, in their preferences for the two mobile networks, as speci…ed below.
It is further assumed that when consumers choose which network(s) to join, they know their bene…ts from mobility, but do not yet know their network preference. For example, consumers may …rst decide whether or not to have a mobile phone and which one (e.g.,
an iPhone or an Android phone), and only afterwards decide which mobile operator to subscribe to. Finally, mobile networks incur a …xed cost f per subscriber, marginal costs of origination and termination c o and c t , and on-net costs c = c o + c t . The mobile termination rate, 3 Intertemporal substitution, i.e. the possibility for consumers that are on the road to postpone calls until they arrive at home, is ignored. 4 This timing assumption leads to simpler expressions for market shares and keeps the analysis technically feasible.
5 Thus the determination of customer segments corresponds to the "passive belief" approach suggested by Hurkens and Lopez (2014) . 6 A model where m , mx and x vary with out-of-equilibrium tari¤s (rather than only equilibrium tari¤s) has been also analyzed by the authors. The results are qualitatively similar though mathematically much more complicated. applied regardless of whether calls originate from a mobile or a …xed network, is a c t .
Denote by n = a c t the termination mark-up. Similarly, the …xed network has a …xed cost per subscriber f x , marginal costs c xo < c o and c xt < c t , on-net costs c x = c xo + c xt , and a termination rate a x c xt with mark-up n x = a x c xt . Given that …xed termination rates tend to be regulated close to cost, it is assumed throughout that a x < c t .
For now, the following assumption regarding the marginal costs of calls is made:
Assumption 1: The marginal costs of calls, including termination rates, are ordered as follows:
Given that marginal costs and termination rates on …xed networks tend to be far below those of mobile networks, the only actually restrictive assumption is the rightmost inequality. It states that the mobile termination rate is so high that …xed-tomobile calls have higher perceived marginal costs than mobile-to-mobile calls, that is,
. This assumption describes an initial phase of development of mobile markets, where mobile termination rates are much higher than …xed termination rates. For example, a recent report by BEREC (2013) shows that the average termination rate in the EU27 in January 2013 was equal to 2.58ecents/minute, while the average …xed termination rate ranged between 0.50 and 0.80ecents/minute according to the level (Layer) of interconnection. Hence, termination on mobile networks is still at least three times more expensive than on …xed networks.
However, in many EU countries termination rates are still being cut considerably by national regulators. This implies that in the medium-term termination rates will approach marginal cost (i.e., n ! 0). Hence, the ordering of marginal costs of calls may change.
Therefore, the case of very low mobile termination rates is also considered below.
Tari¤s and surplus. Mobile network i charges a tari¤ (F i ; p i ; p ix ), where F i is a monthly …xed fee, and p i and p ix are the mobile-to-mobile and mobile-to-…xed per-minute call prices. 7 Similarly, the …xed network o¤ers a tari¤ (F x ; p x ; p xm ), where F x is its monthly …xed fee, p x its on-net price, and p xm the …xed-to-mobile per-minute call price.
It is postulated (and con…rmed in the simulations below), that the following ordering of 7 In order to focus on the e¤ects of interconnection between …xed and mobile networks, a uniform mobile-to-mobile call price is assumed, ruling out di¤erent prices for on-net and o¤-net calls.
prices holds:
Note that due to assumption (1), condition (2) holds when equilibrium prices are equal or close to their respective marginal cost.
The consumption utility from a call of length q is u(q), where u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0.
For k 2 fx; ix; i; xmg, the caller's indirect utility is v k = v (p k ) = max q u(q) p k q, and the call duration is q k = v 0 (p k ). Apart from the surplus obtained from making calls, subscribers obtain an access surplus that depends on the network(s) they subscribe to. If a consumer subscribes only to a mobile network or to the …xed network, his subscription surplus is A m or A x , respectively. If he subscribes to both types of networks, he obtain an access surplus of A mx .
When an FM-subscriber of network i is on the move, the order of prices (2) implies that it is cheaper for him to make mobile-to-…xed calls than mobile-to-mobile calls when receivers are at home (p ix < p i ). Thus, mobile-to-mobile calls are only made when receivers are themselves on the move. 8 When at home, the same subscriber can use either his …xed phone or his mobile phone. From (2), he uses his …xed phone to call other people at home (p x < p ix ), and his mobile phone to call people on the move (p i < p xm ).
The expected surplus of subscribing both to the …xed network and to mobile network i is thus given by
where m = m + mx denotes the number of receivers on mobile phones, i.e. all M-subscribers plus FM-subscribers when the latter are on the move. Equally, x =
(1 ) ( mx + x ) describes the number of receivers on …xed phones, which are all Fand FM-subscribers if and only if they are at home.
The surplus (3) is equal to the access surplus minus the …xed fees, plus the surplus of calling M-subscribers and FM-subscribers on the move, plus the surplus of calling FMand F-subscribers when they are at home, either from the road with probability or from home with probability 1 . At home, there is substitution to cheaper …xed on-net calls to reach …xed phones and to cheaper mobile-to-mobile calls to reach mobile phones (…xed-to-mobile calls are never used by FM-subscribers).
A mobile-only user makes all calls with his mobile phone, and obtains the surplus
Similarly, a …xed-only user makes all calls from his …xed line, and receives the surplus
Note that …xed-only users are the only group of consumers that makes …xed-to-mobile calls.
Subscription decisions and market shares. As already mentioned, consumers di¤er in their preferences for mobile networks. They learn these preferences after deciding to take out a mobile subscription, but before choosing a speci…c mobile network. The former decision is based on the expected surplus of having a mobile subscription, while the latter decision is taken after comparing actual tari¤s and takes into account the preference for one or the other network.
For given tari¤s (F i ; p i ; p ix ) and resulting surpluses w Consumers are assumed to correctly anticipate that the mobile market equilibrium will be symmetric; they therefore expect to subscribe to each mobile network with probability 1=2. Ex post, consumers choose the mobile network that is closer to their taste. Denoting by > 0 the expected disutility from not obtaining a perfect match in their operator choice, 9 subscribers expect surplus w x on the …xed network, and
, and
Since consumers have rational expectations, in equilibrium it is imposed that w k = w k , for k 2 fm; mx; xg, that is, the expected surpluses must be equal to the realized ones.
Consumer heterogeneity is captured in the bene…ts from mobility with the following assumption: The utility of consumer l from taking subscription decision k 2 fm; mx; xg is de…ned by the linear random utility model
where " lk is a random term. 10 The number of consumers in each segment k 2 fm; mx; xg is then given by an expression
where P k is the probability of choice k, @P k =@ w k > 0, @P k =@ w l 0 for l 6 = k, and
Pro…ts. The number of customers of mobile network i = 1; 2 without access to a …xed phone is
, and its pro…ts are given by (j 6 = i)
The …rst line of equation (7) gives the pro…ts due to …xed fees and calls to other mobile users, the second line the pro…ts from calls to the …xed network, and the last line those from termination. 9 For the Hotelling framework, we have = 2 R 1=2 0 x= (2 ) dx = 1=(8 ). 10 The distribution of " lk is not relevant for the determination of equilibrium tari¤s. In our simulations below we assume a logit choice model. The value of any potential outside option is normalized to zero.
For the …xed network, pro…ts are
Again, subscription pro…ts are on the …rst line, together with pro…ts from on-net calls.
Pro…ts from calls to mobiles are on the second line, and termination pro…ts are on the last line.
Expected consumer surplus is given by an expression that depends on expected surpluses and the discrete choice model for customer segments,
and total welfare is
Let,us now recall the sequence of events. In a …rst stage, consumers decide which technology to adopt (F, M, or FM). Then, mobile operators set their retail tari¤s. Third, consumers learn their …xed bene…ts from mobility, and the consumers who adopted the mobile technology choose their mobile operator. Fourth, and …nally, consumers make call decisions. The solution concept adopted is subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Consumers'decisions at Stage 3 and 4 have already been determined. The following analysis starts with Stage 2 where mobile operators set their retail tari¤s.
Equilibrium Tari¤s
The symmetric equilibrium in the mobile market is found by solving mobile networks'
pro…t-maximization problems, taking the segmentation of customers in F-, FM-and Msubscribers as given. On the other hand, the standard procedure of maximizing networks' pro…ts over call prices, while holding the number of each network's subscribers constant, fails because of "composition e¤ects": Mobile-to-…xed prices enter Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, symmetric mobile equilibrium tari¤s are given by:
1. A mobile-to-mobile call price equal to average marginal cost,
2. a mobile-to-…xed call price at or below marginal cost,
where
3. …xed fees equal to
Equilibrium pro…ts are i = 4 :
Pro…ts i and mobile-to-mobile call prices p i have the standard form for uniform tari¤s in the Hotelling model, that is, they are equal to the "transport cost" 1=2 times the subscriber number, and perceived average marginal cost, respectively (Armstrong, 1998; La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a) .
The mobile-to-…xed call price p ix is set below marginal cost if n > 0. This pricing structure arises because mobile-only customers both make more mobile-to-…xed calls and receive more incoming calls. Thus, when the mobile termination rate is above cost these customers bring in higher termination pro…ts. Competition then transforms the latter into a discount on the service that mobile-only customers use more than other customers, that is, mobile-to-…xed calls. This is borne out by the fact that the distortion in p ix disappears when the mobile termination rate is set at cost, i.e., a = c t . Thus, the combination of call substitution and customer heterogeneity gives rise to a distorted usage pricing structure.
For the regulated monopoly …xed network, cost-based call pricing and the zero-pro…t constraint imply, given the symmetric equilibrium in the mobile market, that p x = c x , p xm = c xo + a, and
Equilibrium Tari¤s when Mobile Termination Rates are (almost) at Cost
Suppose now that the mobile termination rate is low, i.e., a a : The ranking of marginal cost changes to:
Assumption 2: The marginal costs of calls are ordered as follows:
Under this assumption, the relevant ordering of prices becomes:
That is, …xed-to-mobile calls become cheaper than mobile-to-mobile calls.
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While mobile-only and …xed-only users' surplus remains unchanged, FM-users now can call mobiles from home at a cheaper price. Therefore, their surplus changes to:
that is, they substitute away from mobile calls whenever possible and mobile-to-mobile calls only have weight .
The corresponding pro…ts become:
Compared to (7), the weights of mobile-to-mobile incoming and outgoing calls has de-creased, while now there are more incoming …xed-to-mobile calls. Following the same approach as in the proof of Proposition 1, the following result is found:
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Proposition 2 Under Assumption 2, symmetric mobile equilibrium tari¤s are given by:
1. a mobile-to-mobile call price at or below marginal cost,
Proposition 2 presents an interesting novelty as compared to Proposition 1. Recall that in the previous case the presence of a high termination rate leads to expensive …xed-to-mobile calls, i.e., p xm > p i . In this case there is no distortion in the mobileto-mobile price p i because both M-only and FM-customers make the same number of mobile-to-mobile calls. When instead the mobile termination rate is low, …xed-to-mobile calls become cheaper than mobile-to-mobile calls, i.e., p xm < p i . In this case, the price of mobile-to-mobile calls, p i , is downward distorted because FM-customers substitute away from these calls when they are at home. Thus, …rms use both mobile-to-…xed and mobile-to-mobile calls to price discriminate.
Finally, the call prices and …xed fee on the …xed network are the same as above: In particular, the …xed fee does not change since call prices are set at cost and therefore even though the number of calls on the …xed network has increased this has no e¤ect on pro…ts.
3 Simulation Results
The E¤ects of Termination Rates on Subscriptions
This section studies the e¤ect of …xed and mobile termination rates on subscription decisions. In particular, the question is whether higher termination rates raise or lower the number of subscribers for each network technology, and whether there are cross-e¤ects.
Due to the complex expressions for the equilibrium …xed fees and mobile-to-…xed prices, and independently of the actual subscription demand model (6), numerical simulations must be performed.
In the following, a logit subscription demand model is adopted. A m = A mx = 1. Varying the termination rates c xt a x < c t and a c t (with a change in substitution pattern at a = a = 0:28 as explained above), 13 one can determine how the number of …xed and mobile subscribers changes depending on the levels of …xed and mobile termination rates.
14 Table 1 reports the results from simulating equilibrium subscriber shares. For di¤erent 13 All the following results correspond to the "high termination rate case" for a a (including the border case at a = 0:28), and the "low termination rate case" for a < a .
14 The simulations have been run under other demand models and parameter con…gurations, with qualitatively similar results.
combinations of mobile and …xed termination rates a and a x , it reports the total numbers of mobile ( m + mx ) and …xed ( x + mx ) subscribers, as well the number of those who do not subscribe to any o¤er ( o ). Table 1 : E¤ect of the levels of the mobile (a) and …xed (a x ) termination rates on the shares of mobile, …xed and non-subscribing customers.
Two main results are obtained. First, a higher …xed (resp., mobile) termination rate increases the total number of …xed (resp., mobile) subscribers. This is by virtue of the waterbed e¤ect: Higher pro…ts from the termination of cross-network calls are handed on to consumers through lower subscription fees. These lower subscription fees then increase the take-up of the respective service. On the other hand, increasing a termination rate decreases the total number of subscribers on the other network. For example, increasing the mobile termination rate makes some consumers drop their …xed connection and opt for only having a mobile one. This e¤ect occurs because setting a higher mobile termination rate increases the price of …xed-to-mobile calls (via a "cost e¤ect"), which makes keeping a …xed connection less attractive. These simulation results suggest that the regulatory policy in e¤ect during the last decade increased …xed-mobile access substitution via two separate channels: The conjunction of higher mobile termination rates and low …xed termination rates both stimulated the take-up of mobile services, while encouraging consumers to drop their …xed connection.
The second main result is that the number of customers who subscribe to neither a …xed nor a mobile network increases with the level of the mobile termination rate (The e¤ect of the …xed termination rate is ambiguous). While the simulations con…rm the often-heard claim that higher mobile termination rates increase mobile uptake, they also show that the accompanying reduction in the number of customers of the …xed network is larger -the pool of non-subscribers increases. As just mentioned, the latter e¤ect is due to higher …xed-to-mobile prices and the resulting lower surplus from holding a …xed connection. Thus, society faces a trade-o¤ between realizing more bene…ts from mobility, through a larger number of mobile subscriptions, and more connectivity, through a larger number of consumers who are connected to any network. This and related welfare tradeo¤s are discussed in the following section.
Optimal Termination Rates
As shown in the previous section, …xed and mobile termination rates have an e¤ect on subscriber numbers. An important question is then how di¤erent combinations of termination rates a¤ect di¤erent groups of customers and the …rms, and which leads to the highest welfare. Table 2 : E¤ect of the levels of the mobile (a) and …xed (a x ) termination rates on consumer surplus, pro…ts and total welfare.
Clearly, the e¤ects of mobile and …xed termination rates are quite di¤erent. Higher mobile termination rates increase consumer surplus and welfare while they are below a , 15 but decrease both when they are above a . The latter occurs because …xed-to-mobile calls have become so expensive that just …xed-only customers use them -which even weakens the waterbed e¤ect identi…ed above.
15 Using a …ne grid of termination rate values it has been veri…ed that this is indeed the case.
At the same time, mobile operators'pro…ts continue to increase over the whole range.
Mobile operators thus prefer mobile termination rates above the welfare-maximizing level, even taking into account the bene…ts from mobility. On the other hand, consumer surplus, mobile operator pro…ts and welfare are highest with …xed termination rates at cost (unless mobile termination rates are very high), which implies that setting them at cost is both the right thing to do and uncontroversial. 16 While these simulated values are not the outcome of a calibrated model (and thus should not be taken literally), they indicate that in the initial phase of the market it was indeed a socially optimal policy to set a …xed termination rate at cost and to allow mobile termination rates signi…cantly above marginal cost.
It is also a relevant exercise to decompose consumer surplus into its various components, as each customer group should be a¤ected di¤erently. The corresponding simulations results have been collected in Table 3 . Table 3 : E¤ect of the levels of the mobile (a) and …xed (a x ) termination rates on surplus of mobile-only, …xed-mobile and …xed-only customers.
All consumer groups prefer mobile termination rates at or below a , but just mobileonly customers have a clear preference for a mobile termination rate above cost (actually, just below a ). While the latter clearly prefer cost-based …xed termination rates, both …xed-mobile and …xed-only customers are in favour of higher levels.
Thus, the interests of customer groups diverge, which may in particular a¤ects those consumers at the margin of dropping out of the market altogether. This indicates that the optimal regulatory policy to be adopted in each case may depend on whether for 16 Remember that by de…nition the …xed network's pro…ts are zero in this scenario.
social or other reasons the interests of various customer groups are weighted di¤erently or not.
Conclusions
Mobile telephony has been a tremendous success in the last two decades, making large inroads into the …xed telephony market. Subscribers in many countries now use their mobiles more than their …xed lines, and quite often disconnect the latter. This paper presented a model that captures the substitution between …xed and mobile telephony at the subscription and call level, by taking into account consumer mobility (i.e., the fact that consumers are sometimes at home, and sometimes on the road). In a rather general framework with two competing mobile networks and a regulated …xed network, the paper has shown that call substitution a¤ects retail pricing incentives, in particular when customer heterogeneity makes it worthwhile to discriminate between customers with di¤erent substitution possibilities.
Numerical simulations are then used to analyze the e¤ects of …xed and mobile termination rates on the number of …xed and mobile users. It is shown that termination rates do have an e¤ect on subscription substitution and …xed disconnection: A higher mobile (…xed) termination rate increases the number of mobile (…xed) users and lowers that of …xed (mobile) users, via the waterbed and cost e¤ects, respectively. Higher termination rates also tend to increase the number of customers who do not adhere to any network, identifying a trade-o¤ between the uptake of individual networks and total uptake.
Lastly, the analysis indicates that socially optimal …xed termination rates tend to be at cost, which is the level also preferred by both mobile operators and mobile-only customers (but not …xed-mobile and mobile-only customers). On the other hand, socially optimal mobile termination rates are found above marginal cost, but below the level where they trigger substitution away from …xed-to-mobile calls. Mobile operators prefer rates clearly above the social optimum, mobile-only customers at the social optimum and the other consumers prefer rates below the latter. Thus, regulation of mobile termination rates is justi…ed even taking into account access and call substitution, but interests of di¤erent customer groups do not coincide.
Future research will contemplate the possibility of bundling among …xed and mobile
The following derivatives are needed, all originating from For p i , the …rst-order condition is
Combining these two …rst-order conditions leads directly to
For p ix one obtains where the latter inequality follows from < 1 and m , mx > 0. Combining the conditions for p ix and F i , and using T 1 = F i f , leads to the following outcome: Solving the …rst-order condition for the …xed fee then yields
